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Abstract  
Whistleblowing is a form of organizational dissent that is 
rarely successful, instead usually leading to disaster for the 
whistleblower. Organizational theorists seldom have 
addressed the question of how to improve whistleblowers' 
strategies. A useful general perspective for doing this is to 
conceive of bureaucracies as authoritarian political systems. 
The concept of political jiu-jitsu, from the theory of 
nonviolent action, is adapted to organizational contexts and 
used to assess a range of tactics used by organizational elites 
against dissidents. The resulting implications for 
whistleblower strategies are assessed by comparison with 
standard recommendations offered by experienced 
whistleblower advisers. 
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The term "whistleblowing" can be used very broadly to refer 
to an act of dissent or defined in a precise way, for example 
as "an open disclosure about significant wrongdoing made 
by a concerned citizen totally or predominantly motivated 
by notions of public interest, who has perceived the 
wrongdoing in a particular role and initiates the disclosure 
of her or his own free will, to a person or agency capable of 
investigating the complaint and facilitating the correction of 
wrongdoing" (De Maria 1995: 447). Most studies of 
whistleblowing have focused on open principled dissent by 
employees, with attention commonly given to exemplary 
stories about whistleblowers, procedures for handling 
disclosures, whistleblower legislation, and characteristics of 
whistleblowers (Alford 2001; De Maria 1999; Dempster 
1997; Elliston et al. 1985; Ewing 1977; Glazer and Glazer 
1989; Hunt 1995, 1998; Lampert 1985; Miceli and Near 
1992; Miethe 1999; Nader, Petkas and Blackwell 1972; 
Peters and Branch 1972; Truelson 1987; Vinten 1994; 
Westin, Kurtz, and Robbins 1981). Embedded in the 
literature are many practical hints about how whistleblowers 
can be more effective - especially by suggesting what not to 
do - but few of these recommendations are backed by 
theoretical grounding.  
From the point of view of employers, writings on 
whistleblowing provide much high-minded advice on setting 
up and running proper procedures for employee disclosures. 
On the other hand, a Machiavellian employer could extract 
from whistleblower stories many ideas on how to suppress 
dissident employees (Kennedy 1985; Westhues 1998). Not 
surprisingly, there is little published that explicitly tells how 
to squash an employee who exposes high-level or systemic 
corruption, though this occurs all the time. 
A problem for employers is how to deal with employees 
who make disclosures that are false and damaging to the 
organization. The temptation is to suppress them, even 
though some such employees eventually turn out to be 
correct. Again, there is little in the literature to guide 
employers who have to deal with a misguided or malicious 
employee who adopts the guise of a whistleblower. The gap 
here is between descriptive and analytical literature that 
addresses misbehavior, for example Ackroyd and 
Thompson's Organizational Misbehaviour (1999), and the 
literature that addresses purposeful or accidental missteps 
and whistleblowing, for example Vaughan's The Challenger 
Launch Decision (1996), and analytical and though more 
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prescriptive pieces on miscues, like Perrow's Normal 
Accidents (1984) or recent works along these lines on "high 
reliability" organizations.  
Just as whistleblowers and employers have no theory to 
guide their actions, so researchers have no standard way to 
analyze the dynamics of organizational dissent. That is, 
there are no standard ways to analyze strategies of dissent 
along with likely responses and responses to those responses 
or, in other words, to analyze the "dance of dissent." In an 
effort to address this gap, this article is meant to be a 
theoretical "pot stirrer" in that we seek to add a theoretical 
perspective that seems to offer both theoretical insight and 
practical application, but which has not previously been 
applied to whistleblowing situations. The focus on a "dance 
of dissent" necessitates addressing the whistleblower and the 
accountable manager or organization in concert. In contrast 
to more traditional whistleblowing literature, actions are 
depicted in terms of the strategies and counterstrategies 
pursued by each side rather than in terms of the moral ends 
that are the aims of these strategies. That is, you are seeing 
the "dance" rather than the spots where the partners begin 
the dance and where they end. One aim is to generate theory 
to help dissenter and manager determine what strategies and 
responses to employ in which situations and why. The 
manager, in particular, can gain insight into how to explore 
dissent to determine whether it is due to one individual's 
problems (for example, personality conflicts) and/or 
organizational problems (such as morally repugnant 
behavior).  
We address this gap by drawing on the concept of political 
jiu-jitsu (Sharp, 1973). If a group of peaceful protesters is 
brutally attacked by police or shot by soldiers, this action 
can rebound against the attackers by generating more public 
support for the protesters, attracting more supporters to the 
protest cause and even causing some of the attacker group to 
recoil. This is an example of a process called political jiu-
jitsu because the attack causes the attackers to lose balance 
as in the Japanese system of unarmed combat called jiu-
jitsu. This concept can be adapted for use in studying 
organizational dynamics. There have been a few studies 
comparing nonviolent action and whistleblowing (Elliston 
1982; Martin 1999b), but these have not examined political 
jiu-jitsu. 
Of the many models of power and conflict in organizations 
(Farazmand 1999; Kolb and Bartunek 1992; Lee and 
Lawrence 1985), the foundation that is most useful for 
applying nonviolence theory to organizations is the idea that 
bureaucracy is analogous to an authoritarian state. Weinstein 
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(1977, 1979) argues that bureaucracies are political as well 
as administrative structures, because their operation 
normally, though not exclusively, involves power, conflict 
and domination. According to Weinstein, bureaucracies 
cannot be solely administrative because not all goals are 
shared and hence the exercise of power is required for 
action. In addition, managers are not always "rational" with 
respect to achieving publicly-stated organizational goals; 
each has his or her own agenda. In a typical bureaucracy, 
control is exercised by elites through a hierarchy, with little 
or no popular participation in organizational governance. 
Accordingly, Weinstein draws an analogy between 
bureaucracies and authoritarian states: employees and 
citizens lack freedoms. Just as there can be opposition 
movements within states, so there can be oppositions within 
bureaucracies. Trade unions are a form of opposition, 
though with no expectation of formally taking power. One 
major difference between authoritarian states and 
bureaucracies is that the latter do not today have overt 
control over means of physical violence, with some 
exceptions such as police and military bureaucracies. 
Therefore struggles within bureaucracies occur largely 
without overt use of physical violence. 
The conception of bureaucracies as analogous to political 
systems allows the application of a host of political 
analyses. Zald and Berger (1978) examine social 
movements within corporate hierarchical organizations, 
looking specifically at organizational coups, bureaucratic 
insurgency, and mass movements. Rothschild and Miethe 
(1994, 1999) treat whistleblowing as a form of political 
resistance. In this tradition, this article brings nonviolent 
action theory to bear. 
In the next section, political jiu-jitsu is explained and then 
adapted for application to organizational struggles. The 
following section examines a number of tactics used by 
employers that prevent or reduce backfire from an attack on 
an outspoken employee. Whistleblowers in turn can counter 
these tactics by acting in ways that maintain the potential for 
organizational jiu-jitsu. To assess the soundness of these 
theoretically derived whistleblower countermeasures, they 
are compared to standard recommendations from 
experienced whistleblower advisers. 
   
Political jiu-jitsu 
Nonviolent methods of action have been used for hundreds 
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of years, but theorizing this mode of action did not begin 
until the 1900s. Gandhi (1927/1929) is recognized as the 
pioneer of nonviolence as a consciously designed mode of 
struggle, though his own voluminous writings do not present 
a precise theoretical picture. Nonetheless, his combination 
of theory and action inspired many others (Bondurant 1988; 
Gregg 1966; Shridharani 1939). Gandhi had a principled 
commitment to nonviolence, though his own practice was 
often quite savvy (Sharp, 1979). However, many 
practitioners choose nonviolence not for ethical reasons but 
because it seems more likely to be effective. This pragmatic 
approach is dominant in the West. 
Gene Sharp is widely regarded as the foremost theorist of 
pragmatic nonviolence. In his classic work The Politics of 
Nonviolent Action, Sharp (1973) draws upon a huge range of 
literature to develop a comprehensive account of the 
methods and dynamics of nonviolent action. He describes 
nearly 200 different methods, for example picketing, 
symbolic sounds, vigils, mock funerals, ostracism, protest 
emigration, lockouts, trade embargoes, prisoners' strikes, 
working-to-rule strikes, boycotts of elections, 
noncooperation with conscription, withholding of 
diplomatic recognition, sit-ins, guerrilla theater, alternative 
markets, and overloading of administrative systems.  
There are numerous historical examples where such 
methods have been effective in opposing aggression, 
repression, and oppression, such as popular insurrections 
against Latin American dictatorships (Parkman 1990), 
resistance to the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia in 
1968 (Skilling 1976; Windsor and Roberts 1969), collapse 
of Eastern European regimes in 1989 (Randle 1991), and 
toppling of Serbian dictator Slobodan Milosevic in 2000 
(see generally Ackerman and Duvall 2000; Cooney and 
Michalowski 1977; Crow, Grant, and Ibrahim 1990; 
McAllister 1991; McManus and Schlabach 1991; Semelin 
1993; Zunes 1999). 
Generalizing from these and many other examples, Sharp 
(1973: 449-814) developed a model for the dynamics of 
nonviolent action. Its stages include preparation for 
nonviolent action, a challenge that brings on repression, 
solidarity and discipline in the face of repression, political 
jiu-jitsu, and redistribution of power. Sharp recognizes that 
not every stage will be involved in every case and in 
particular that political jiu-jitsu will not be involved in every 
nonviolent struggle.  
When violence is used against nonviolent opponents, this 
tends to evoke sympathy and support for the nonviolent 
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group and undermine support for the attackers. This process 
Sharp (1973: 657-703) calls political jiu-jitsu, an expansion 
of the concept of "moral jiu-jitsu" (Gregg 1966) that, 
following Gandhi, emphasized the psychological 
transformation brought about in attackers by disciplined 
nonviolent resistance. It can be illustrated by some famous 
instances. On January 9, 1905, hundreds of peaceful 
protesters in St Petersburg, Russia, were shot down in what 
became known as Bloody Sunday, generating outrage 
throughout the country and undermining support for the 
Czar (Harcave 1964). On March 21, 1960, South African 
police shot into a crowd of protesters, killing perhaps a 
hundred people, in what became known as the Sharpeville 
massacre, causing worldwide outrage against the apartheid 
regime (Frankel 2001). Some of the Sharpeville protesters 
had thrown stones but not caused serious injuries; it was the 
disproportionate response of the police that galvanized 
world opinion and led to economic sanctions. In 1998, 
Indonesian police opened fire on protesting university 
students, killing several. This act inflamed popular opinion 
against the Suharto regime and was a key to its downfall not 
long after (Forrester and May 1998). 
This notion of outrage parallels Sandman's (1987) concept 
of "outrage" in the field of risk perception and risk 
communication. Sandman enumerates factors, such as 
voluntariness, control, fairness, memorability, and dread, 
that cause the physical hazard of a risk to be multiplied in 
the eyes of those facing the risk. The risk perceived by an 
observer then becomes the sum of the mathematically 
calculated hazard plus a component of "outrage," which 
represents this string of factors perceived by the beholder. In 
the same sense here, the potential for "outrage" raises the 
perceived risk of pursuing certain strategies, such as 
violence.  
Sharp says that political jiu-jitsu operates "among three broad 
groups: 1) uncommitted third parties, whether on the local scene 
or the world level; 2) the opponent's usual supporters, and 3) the 
general grievance group" (Sharp 1973: 658). The key in each case 
seems to be a perception of injustice (Moore 1978): people are 
moved by the spectacle of a person suffering under an attack yet 
not hitting back. This evokes sympathy among previously neutral 
onlookers, weakens unity among the attacking group, and 
stimulates greater support among the grievance group. 
This mobilization of support is not universal: for example, some 
opponents may be hardened in their opposition. The increase in 
sympathy is an empirically observed tendency, not an automatic 
process. 
If the grievance group is seen to have a just cause - suffering 
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unfair discrimination or denial of human rights, for example - that 
alone can generate support. Political jiu-jitsu is a process in 
addition to this, generated by the struggle itself. Observers may 
disagree with the cause advocated by a protester but if the 
protester is beaten or shot while behaving peacefully and 
respectfully, this procedural injustice can generate sympathy or 
outrage. 
Even a small amount of violence by the grievance group can 
undermine this dynamic, which explains why governments 
employ agents provocateurs to foment violence by opposition 
groups. The Palestinian-Israeli struggle illustrates how violence 
can undermine support for a challenging group. For many years, 
the Palestinian Liberation Organization used terrorism with little 
success. Then in 1987 the first intifada erupted spontaneously. It 
was unarmed and largely nonviolent, allowing and encouraging 
much greater Palestinian participation, producing much greater 
international sympathy and dividing Israelis. Arguably, the first 
intifada (ending in 1993) could have been even more effective 
had it been entirely nonviolent (Dajani, 1994; Rigby, 1991). In 
the second intifada starting in 2000, Palestinian suicide bombings 
have played a prominent role. From a nonviolence point of view, 
these bombings have been completely counterproductive, 
especially by hardening Israeli attitudes against the Palestinian 
cause. Even though many more Palestinians than Israelis have 
been killed in the second intifada, many observers simply see a 
struggle with violence on both sides. Political jiu-jitsu is far less 
effectively invoked in such a circumstance. 
Nonviolence research commonly focuses on actions, such as 
rallies, vigils, strikes, and sit-ins, that are in the "public arena," in 
situations where the adjective "nonviolent" refers to absence of 
physical violence by the activists and where force or physical 
violence may be and often is used by opponents against activists, 
such as arrests, imprisonment, beatings, and killings. Indeed, 
central to the standard image of the nonviolent activist is putting 
one's body on the line, even though many methods, such as 
boycotts, involve a withdrawal rather than a presence. The upshot 
is that nonviolence theory and practice have tended to be 
restricted to particular types of action, especially those where 
activists are physically present in public spaces. Nonviolence 
researchers have given little attention to struggles inside 
organizations. In order to apply the concept of political jiu-jitsu to 
organizations, then, it must be broadened beyond its ties to 
physical bodies protesting in public spaces and confronted by 
physical violence.  
  
Whistleblowing as a threat 
The key action taken by whistleblowing employees is speaking 
out. This might be reporting corrupt practice to a superior or 
alerting a journalist to public hazards. Sharp's catalogue of 
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methods of nonviolent action includes some types of speech, such 
as public speeches, letters of opposition or support, signed public 
statements, petitions, leaflets, and newspapers. Since these sorts 
of action are routine in liberal democracies, they are normally 
labeled "nonviolent action" only when they are not routine, such 
as a dissenting public speech in Nazi Germany. Therefore, actions 
by whistleblowers would seldom be classified as "nonviolent 
action" by the usual definition. 
Nonetheless, managers often appear to be deeply threatened by 
whistleblowers, who are subject to severe reprisals, including 
ostracism, petty harassment, threats, punitive transfers, referral to 
psychiatrists, formal reprimands, demotion, and dismissal. 
Management's response, when perceived as excessive, can 
generate sympathy for the whistleblower. Many observers see an 
injustice when a lone individual reports a problem that needs 
fixing or investigation and management responds with a massive 
attack on the credibility, working conditions, and livelihood of the 
individual. Political jiu-jitsu inside organizations will be called 
here organizational jiu-jitsu, which can be considered a subset of 
all types of political jiu-jitsu. 
Prominent whistleblower cases seem to fit this pattern. After 
Ralph Nader exposed auto safety problems in his book Unsafe at 
Any Speed, General Motors put him under surveillance and 
attempted to undermine his credibility. Public exposure of these 
underhanded tactics generated visibility and greater support for 
Nader (Whiteside 1972). A. Ernest Fitzgerald (1972, 1989) blew 
the whistle on massive cost overruns in U.S. Defense Department 
contracting and came under sustained attack, including being 
dismissed. His revelations and experiences triggered widespread 
consternation and generated support, especially in Congress, that 
led to some degree of success. After Daniel Ellsberg made public 
the secret documents that became known as the Pentagon Papers, 
he was indicted by the US government and faced 12 felony 
charges; the attacks on Ellsberg eventually backfired against the 
government and helped lead to President Richard Nixon's 
resignation (Ellsberg 2002).  
Hugh DeWitt is a physicist who worked at the Lawrence 
Livermore National Laboratory, where nuclear weapons are 
designed, though DeWitt did only non-military physics research. 
He was also a vocal critic at times, writing articles, giving 
testimony, and speaking to journalists, for example in openly 
criticizing the lab managers' opposition to a comprehensive 
nuclear test ban. When DeWitt came under fire at the lab for his 
statements, he was able to mobilize support from a wide range of 
public figures outside the lab, causing the managers to back away. 
In effect, he was sufficiently well known and respected outside 
the lab so that attempts to muzzle him were likely to generate 
even greater publicity for his ideas and his plight. As a result, he 
was left alone by management most of the time. This suggests 
that lab bosses were quite aware that attacking DeWitt could 
backfire: in other words, the prospect of organizational jiu-jitsu 
helped to deter attacks.  
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In most Hollywood portrayals of whistleblowers, such as 
policeman Frank Serpico, nuclear industry worker Karen 
Silkwood (in films named after them) and tobacco industry 
scientist Jeffrey Wigand (in The Insider), the sympathies of the 
film producers and audiences are clearly with the dissident 
employee. No doubt this is partly sympathy for the underdog, but 
the perceived unfairness of heavy-handed attacks on dissident 
employees surely plays a role.  
  
Organizational jiu-jitsu: use and 
inhibition 
Much can be learned about organizational jiu-jitsu by careful 
dissection of exemplary cases to identify strategies undertaken by 
managers and a range of responses undertaken by whistleblowers. 
One can see the power that each side wields, particularly in an 
interplay of public revelation versus confidential discussion or 
attempts at cover-up, denial, and secrecy. In fact, the "dance of 
dissent" seems to revolve around this public-private distinction as 
much as it is fueled by misbehavior, real or perceived.  
The whistleblowing cases that have been mentioned here are 
atypical in their high visibility. Most whistleblowers neither seek 
nor receive publicity or even support from coworkers, which 
means that there is no direct way to observe the role of 
organizational jiu-jitsu. The relevance of organizational jiu-jitsu 
to these lower-profile cases - by far the most common type - can 
be assessed indirectly by examining ways by which managers can 
inhibit this process and by which whistleblowers can mobilize it. 
That is, by observing the tactics of the contestants in the game, 
we can make inferences about the "rules," namely the central 
dynamic. 
Managers may sincerely believe that the employee who speaks 
out is a self-serving malcontent who deserves no sympathy but 
still realize that reprisals, if too blatant, may backfire. Ill-judged 
and poorly justified attacks may trigger support for the employee 
among fellow workers or union officials, bring matters to the 
attention of outside authorities, or cause splits in management 
itself.  
Note that there are potentially two injustices involved. One is the 
matter raised by the employee, for example favoritism in 
appointments or cheating of clients. The other is the attack on the 
whistleblower, seen as unjust when it is out of all proportion to 
the employee's action. Even those who disagree with the 
employee's allegations may be upset or outraged by the attack. 
How, then, can the potential triggering of organizational jiu-jitsu 
be inhibited? Here we look at several methods that managers have 
used that prevent or reduce the operation of organizational jiu-
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jitsu, in each case considering countermeasures by the 
whistleblower and how these square with advice from 
whistleblower organizations. 
The classic advice manual for whistleblowers was Courage 
Without Martyrdom (Stewart, Devine and Rasor 1989), produced 
by the Government Accountability Project (GAP), a US group 
that does advocacy work for whistleblowers. An updated version 
titled The Whistleblower's Survival Guide was written by GAP's 
legal director, Tom Devine (1997). The recommendations in these 
manuals are largely in accord with those presented by other 
experienced whistleblower advisers (Lennane, 1996; Martin 
1999a), suggesting that those who assess hundreds of 
whistleblower stories often end up giving the same sorts of 
advice.[1] In the following, for convenience, reference will 
usually be made to advice given by Devine (1997). 
Established whistleblower support groups exist only in Australia, 
Britain and the US, and most individuals with extensive 
experience advising whistleblowers are from these countries. 
Consequently, our assessments concerning organizational jiu-jitsu 
apply most obviously to these countries; further testing is needed 
to determine the wider relevance of our approach. 
  
Method 1: Denial of organizational 
problems 
Organizational jiu-jitsu will be most powerfully invoked when 
there is a clear perception of injustice. The injustice can be 
corruption or other problems in the organization, the treatment of 
the whistleblower, or both. Of the various ways to inhibit 
organizational jiu-jitsu, most involve creating different 
perceptions of what is going on. Though the evidence and its 
interpretation may seem clear-cut to the employee, there are 
numerous ways for management to promote its preferred view.  
If management did not need to worry about perceptions and their 
repercussions, it could make an announcement such as "Top 
management has been running several scams for years, at the 
expense of workers and customers. Employees X and Y have 
complained in public about this and hence have been dismissed." 
Such an open admission is rare, to say the least. Its very rarity is 
testimony to the desire by managers to manage perceptions 
(Jackall 1988). 
Do managers actually believe their claims of good practice, 
innocence of corruption, and the like? Studies of lying and self-
deception suggest that corrupt managers see what they are doing 
as legitimate within the system where they work as they perceive 
it, though they may be aware that others see things differently 
(Barnes 1994; Robinson 1996). Jackall (1988), in his 
anthropological study of executive life in corporations, 
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investigated how managers and coworkers perceived reprisals 
against whistleblowers, finding that most stated that 
whistleblowers deserved what they got because they were not 
playing the corporate game according to the rules. In any case, 
what managers actually believe they are doing is not central to the 
analysis here; it is sufficient to analyze actions taken and to 
perceive them as rationally conceived strategies that have some 
consistency across organizations. 
The observed fact is that managers almost always deny any 
wrongdoing. The whistleblower's allegations about organisational 
problems typically are ignored, dismissed, or attacked. This is the 
first component of official denial.  
To counter this response, whistleblowers need ironclad evidence, 
such as documents revealing the problem. Devine (1997: 14-22) 
lists "twelve basic survival strategies." Point 7 is "Identify and 
copy all necessary supporting records before drawing any 
suspicion to your concerns." Gathering large amounts of evidence 
is repeatedly emphasized in advice to whistleblowers. Collecting 
evidence is important not only to counter denials but because 
officials may destroy or hide evidence. The massive shredding of 
documents at Enron is only one of many examples (Cox and 
Wallace 2002). 
  
Method 2: Denial of reprisals 
The second component of official denial is to deny that any 
reprisals have been visited on the employee who speaks out. The 
employee may be reprimanded, referred to psychiatrists, 
transferred, given little work or too much work, demoted, or 
dismissed. Normally management justifies such official actions 
by claiming that the employee is a "difficult personality," 
incompetent, inadequately trained, or has made some serious 
error. It is not unusual for an outspoken employee's file to be 
scrutinized and old complaints or allegations pulled out - 
sometimes from many years earlier - and used to justify actions. 
A different approach for management is to claim that actions 
taken, such as layoffs or changes in duties, are not targeted at the 
employee in question. 
Devine warns whistleblowers about these sorts of tactics. He lists 
a range of reprisal techniques (Devine, 1997: 28-39): 
Spotlight the whistleblowers, not the wrongdoing: 
employers "obfuscate the dissent by attacking the source's 
motives, credibility, professional competence, or virtually 
anything else that will work to cloud the issue." (p. 28)  
Build a damaging record against them: employers may 
spend months or "years manufacturing a record to brand a 
whistleblower as a chronic problem employee who has 
refused to improve." (p. 31)  
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Threaten them into silence, such as, "You'll never work 
again in this town/industry/agency…"  
Isolate or humiliate them: the whistleblower is separated 
from colleagues or given trivial, low-level duties.  
Set them up for failure by assigning jobs that cannot be 
done properly with the resources available.  
Prosecute them for "stealing" evidence about misconduct.  
Physically attack them.  
Eliminate their jobs or paralyze their careers through 
"reorganizations" or denying promotions.  
Blacklist them to make sure they will never work again in 
their fields.  
Most of these techniques seek to blame the employee for 
misfortunes suffered. For example, "spotlighting the 
whistleblower" is an attempt to say that management is taking 
legitimate actions for dealing with the employee's shortcomings. 
The only responses that do not fit this pattern are threats, isolation 
and humiliation, and these are seldom used by themselves: 
isolation, for example, might be justified by the employee's 
allegedly poor record. 
By providing justifications for its actions, management can inhibit 
organizational jiu-jitsu. To counter this, whistleblowers have to 
demonstrate - desirably, to sympathizers, opponents, and neutral 
observers - that management's actions are illegitimate. Devine and 
others recommend collecting evidence of satisfactory 
performance, such as supervisor's reports before the 
whistleblowing and reprisals. Most importantly, Devine seeks to 
warn potential whistleblowers to be prepared for the standard 
management techniques. 
  
Method 3: Attack the whistleblower 
Another way for management to act against whistleblowers is 
with subtle harassment, such as withdrawal of routine perks such 
as convenient shifts or access to a company car, lost documents, 
delays in processing applications, and a host of other minor things 
that are specific to the job. Often it is very hard for outsiders to 
understand the significance of such matters, although they can 
make a big difference to the quality of working life. There is no 
easy way to expose these forms of harassment, and the best 
response often is to avoid reacting excessively and giving 
management a pretext for labeling the employee as the problem. 
Devine (1997: 16) says to "Maintain good relations with 
administration and support staff."  
Perception management is nothing new. In confrontations during 
the 1930 Salt Satyagraha led by Gandhi, nonviolent activists did 
not resist or flee when they were brutally assaulted by police. 
Instead, new protesters walked forward to accept beatings. Many 
of them were seriously injured and taken to hospital. The British 
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government attempted perception management by claiming that 
protesters were faking their injuries in order to gain sympathy. 
This government lie was exposed by independent journalists who 
witnessed the dramatic confrontation (Weber 1993). 
The most important consequence of political jiu-jitsu is to 
generate greater support for the protesting group, including from 
observers, among the grievance group, and among the opposition 
(management in this case). But political jiu-jitsu is only one way 
for generating greater support. It can also be done in a more direct 
fashion, through standard techniques of organizing (Alinsky 
1971; Fisher 1984). The importance of building support is 
recognized by whistleblower groups. Point 3 of GAP's twelve 
survival strategies is "Be alert and discreetly attempt to learn of 
any other witnesses who are upset about the wrongdoing," and 
point 8 is "Research and identify potential allies, such as elected 
officials, journalists or activists who have proven their sincerity 
and can help expose the wrongdoing" (Devine 1997: 14-15, 19-
20).  
From the point of view of bureaucracies as authoritarian political 
systems, a whistleblower is analogous to a lone dissident openly 
opposing a repressive regime, as in the case of some Soviet 
dissidents. Such individual opposition is undoubtedly courageous 
and can be potent symbolically but it is unlikely to bring about 
change unless others join in forming an opposition movement. 
Similarly, isolated whistleblowers are little threat to management 
power unless others can be induced to take some form of action. 
Devine (1997: 19) says that "Whistleblowers are most often 
successful when they communicate their message to those citizens 
who will benefit from their disclosures; when whistleblowers 
remain isolated, they are more likely to lose." 
If management responds by attacking the whistleblower, this runs 
the risk of generating greater opposition through organizational 
jiu-jitsu. Yet if the whistleblower is not discredited or shut up, 
there is a risk that others may feel empowered to speak up or act. 
This dilemma for management replicates the dilemma for rulers 
when faced by disciplined nonviolent activists. Acquiescence to 
the protesters' demands can allow them to further build strength, 
whereas attack can boomerang against the attackers. 
  
Method 4: Use official channels 
Management has another option that can serve to circumvent both 
these paths: to encourage the use of "official channels" that shunt 
the whistleblower through tortuous administrative procedures that 
inhibit building of support. In the US, some standard official 
channels are federal hotlines, corporate voluntary disclosure 
programs, inspectors general, the Office of the Special Counsel, 
Congress, the False Claims Act, and whistleblower laws. Some 
other avenues, more common in Australia, Britain, and Canada, 
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are ombudsmen, auditors-general, anti-corruption commissions, 
and royal commissions. 
Using official channels is often extremely attractive to 
whistleblowers, many of whom believe in formal procedures: that 
is often why they speak out in the first place. They usually do not 
anticipate the antagonistic response to their disclosures, a 
response that threatens their very sense of self (Alford 2001). 
Reflecting their belief in the existence of justice, they turn to one 
or more of the many appeal bodies, perhaps making a submission 
to an ombudsman, contacting a politician, and launching a court 
case. 
To assess this strategy in terms of organizational jiu-jitsu, it is 
necessary to ask, does taking a case to an official body invoke 
concern or outrage due to a perception of disproportionality 
between the employee's action and the response of the employer? 
The answer is that using official channels usually dampens or 
erases the potential for outrage, because these channels are widely 
seen as fair and independent. Instead of the struggle being 
between a truth-speaking employee who is victimized by a 
powerful employer, the matter is transformed into a dispute 
seemingly being adjudicated independently and fairly, in which 
the parties in contention are on something close to an equal 
footing. Using official channels, then, is likely to inhibit 
organizational jiu-jitsu. 
This is compatible with recommendations by experienced 
whistleblower advisers, which range from advice to use official 
channels with caution to advice to beware of them. A blanket 
recommendation would be inappropriate, since different channels 
offer different prospects of success. What is startling to those new 
to the area is how poorly whistleblowers fare when using official 
channels. 
More than half of The Whistleblower's Survival Guide is a 
systematic assessment of different US official channels, 
beginning with those "that often have proven to be a threat rather 
than a resource for whistleblowers" (Devine 1997: 50). Using 
federal hotlines, for example, often damages the whistleblower, 
for example when the Inspector General breaches confidentiality 
by sending the information to the whistleblower's supervisor, 
leading to reprisals. Devine (1997: 51) says that "hotlines are in 
most cases worthless at best." Similarly, making a disclosure to 
the Office of the Special Counsel "is likely to be unproductive or 
even counterproductive" (Devine, 1997: 69). Even when using 
channels that give better odds of success, Devine recommends 
doing considerable investigation and being very cautious, since 
there are so many pitfalls. Miethe (1999: 147-148) comments that 
"Unfortunately, most legal protection for whistleblowers is 
illusory; few whistleblowers are protected from retaliatory actions 
because of numerous loopholes and special conditions of these 
laws and the major disadvantage that individual plaintiffs have 
against corporate defendants." 
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Martin (1999a) says that official channels always narrow the 
issues and transform the victim's experience into an 
administrative and technical matter. The reason these channels are 
so unsupportive of whistleblowers is that they were either set up 
by employers or have insufficient power, money, or authority to 
tackle powerful organizations. Whistleblowers who use official 
channels "may be worse off, since they have the illusion that help 
is available, and this may delay or deter them from taking other, 
more effective action" (Martin, 1999a: 53-54). 
This advice accords with evidence about whistleblowers' 
experiences. De Maria and Jan (1996), in a major study, found 
that whistleblowers reported being helped by official channels in 
less than one out of ten approaches and were harmed by them on 
many occasions. This finding confirms the observations of 
Devine and others who have heard the stories of hundreds of 
whistleblowers. 
Some official channels are so compromised that advisers 
recommend avoiding them. An example is the Office of the 
Special Counsel, nominally set up to support whistleblowers but 
in practice becoming their opponent in most cases (Devine and 
Aplin, 1988). 
When appealing to official channels, the "audience" is often just a 
few people, such as a judge, severely limiting prospects for 
generating greater support. An alternative course of action is to 
seek to gain a wide audience through publicity. Devine (1997: 82) 
recommends using the news media, though with suitable 
understanding and preparation, commenting that "None of the 
success stories listed at the beginning of this handbook could 
have occurred without the active role of the media." Similarly, 
Martin (1999a: 73-106) recommends the strategy of "building 
support." This approach is fully in accord with political jiu-jitsu, 
which operates by mobilizing greater support for the challenging 
group. 
Most whistleblowers never get started on the process of 
mobilizing support. Some are totally destroyed, both 
psychologically and in terms of career, by their experiences. 
Others pursue official channels in an unending quest for justice 
that can last for decades. For quite a few, the best that this can 
offer is a legal settlement, with a monetary pay-out that seldom 
compensates adequately for years of expense and anguish. Most 
settlements include a silencing clause: the whistleblower is 
expected to agree not to speak about the matters in dispute, not 
even about the details of the settlement itself, including the 
silencing clause. In many cases, no settlement will be offered 
unless a silencing clause is included. This provides one last 
indication of the desire of managers to inhibit wider mobilization 
of support.  
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Conclusion 
The basic idea of political jiu-jitsu, as applied to organizations, is 
that management attacks on dissident employees can backfire if 
observers perceive that this is unfair. Using this approach to 
analyze organizational struggles leads to tactics for 
whistleblowers that are very much in tune with recommendations 
from experienced advisers of whistleblowers. Standard 
management tactics against whistleblowers - denials, cover-ups, 
attacks, and encouraging employees to use official channels - can 
be interpreted as ways of inhibiting or sidestepping organizational 
jiu-jitsu. To maximize the prospect of invoking organizational jiu-
jitsu, employees should:  
exhaustively document their claims and their own work 
performance, to counter denials and destruction of 
evidence;  
document attacks by management, to mobilize support;  
ensure that their message is communicated to allies, 
opponents, and independent observers;  
be wary of official channels, which may inhibit 
mobilization of support by diverting effort and giving the 
impression that justice will be served.  
These recommendations are in accord with advice in 
whistleblower manuals such as Devine (1997) and Martin 
(1999a). The main difference is that these manuals are more open 
to using official channels than might be suggested by an exclusive 
focus on invoking organizational jiu-jitsu. Even this difference is 
not as significant as it may seem. Official channels can be used in 
tandem with mobilizing support: for example, making a 
submission to an agency can be a hook for media coverage, and 
popular expressions of concern sometimes influence official 
bodies to act with greater alacrity and fairness.  
It is also important to remember that political jiu-jitsu is only one 
component in the wider dynamics of nonviolent action. Gandhi, 
for example, always attempted to engage opponents in dialogue 
before launching nonviolence campaigns and would call off 
actions in order to resume dialogue, especially when reforms were 
promised. Although Gandhi's shrewd political judgment was far 
from infallible, the point here is that nonviolence theory does not 
provide a detailed guide to practice, as practice inevitably must be 
informed by practitioners' understandings of local politics, 
options, and risks. Similarly, organizational activists will never 
find a blueprint for action in any theory. What can be said, on the 
basis of the analysis here, is that nonviolence theory can be 
fruitfully applied to organizational struggles and, in particular, 
that the concept of organizational jiu-jitsu has proven useful in 
guiding action, both as an implicit theory-in-use (Argyris and 
Schoen, 1978) and as illuminated in terms of academic theory in 
our analysis.  
Assuming that organizational jiu-jitsu is indeed a key potential 
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dynamic in organizational struggles, then it is possible to derive a 
range of additional recommendations. From a dissident's point of 
view, actions should be taken that will make any attack by 
management as counterproductive as possible. Some possible 
conclusions are: 
always act in an exemplary fashion - for example, be polite 
and supportive of colleagues - to increase the chance that 
an attack is seen as unwarranted;  
be open about one's actions, to counter any possible claims 
about nefariousness (especially given that spreading 
rumors about dissidents is a standard tactic);  
choose forms of action that allow safe participation by 
others - such as petitions signed by people outside the 
organization - to increase the counterproductiveness of 
reprisals;  
always consult carefully before acting, to gauge how 
people will respond to both the action and possible 
management responses.  
These sorts of recommendations are widely adopted by 
nonviolent activists (Coover et al., 1981; Herngren, 1993), who 
routinely advocate behaving in respectful ways, being open, and 
fostering participation in actions and in decision making. So it is 
not surprising that they also would apply to organizational 
struggles. 
Managers can also learn from an analysis in terms of political jiu-
jitsu. This is not to recommend that managers seek better ways to 
destroy whistleblowers; rather, managers have to contend with 
disgruntled or malicious employees, some of whom don the 
mantle of whistleblower. One lesson from organizational jiu-jitsu 
is that a blatant attack on an employee, no matter what the 
employee has done, runs the risk of alienating support or even 
creating a martyr. Ways for management to maximize support by 
honest action include: 
deal with an employee's allegations rather than attacking 
the employee;  
be as open as possible in dealing with complaints, within 
the constraints of confidentiality;  
take actions that will be perceived as proportional to or less 
harsh than any transgression by the employee;  
avoid attempting to silence the employee, as this invokes 
perceptions of procedural injustice.  
If an employee launches a spiteful attack that can be publicly 
recognized as inaccurate and the employer responds with restraint 
and dignity, this is likely to undermine support for the employee - 
a reversal of the usual organizational jiu-jitsu. Such pragmatic 
strategies suggest that greater understanding of organizational jiu-
jitsu by both employees and managers can lead to more effective 
and principled action by all parties, so that "doing the right thing" 
can also achieve morally justifiable ends, a resonance between 
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deontological and utilitarian ethics. 
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whistleblowers and working with whistleblower groups. The 
insights from this practical background are largely in accord with 
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